We consider repeated games with private monitoring that are "close" to repeated games with public/perfect monitoring. A private monitoring information structure is close to a public monitoring information structure when private signals can generate approximately the same distribution of the public signal once they are aggregated into a public signal by some public coordination device. A player's informational size associated with the public coordination device is the key to inducing truth-telling in nearby private monitoring games when communication is possible. A player is informationally small given a public coordination device if she believes that her signal is likely to have a small impact on the public signal generated by the public coordinating device. We show that a uniformly strict equilibrium with public monitoring is robust in a certain sense: it remains an equilibrium in nearby private monitoring repeated games when the associated public coordination device, which makes private monitoring close to public monitoring, keeps every player informationally small at the same time.
Introduction
Cooperation within groups is an important and commonly observed social phenomenon, but the way in which cooperation arises is one of the least understood questions
We are grateful to an associate editor and three anonymous referees for extensive comments. We thank George Mailath for very helpful discussions and the audience in numerous conferences and seminars for helpful comments. Postlewaite gratefully acknowledges support from National Science Foundation grant SBR-9810693. in economics. The theory of repeated games has improved our understanding by showing how coordinated threats to punish can prevent deviations from cooperative behavior, but much of the work in repeated games rests on very restrictive assumption that all players share the same public information either perfectly or imperfectly. For the case in which each player can observe all other players'actions directly (perfect monitoring), Aumann and Shapley [5] and Rubinstein [32] proved a folk theorem without discounting, and Fudenberg and Maskin [13] proved a folk theorem with discounting. For the case in which each player observes a noisy public signal (imperfect public monitoring), Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti [1] characterized the set of pure strategy sequential equilibrium payo¤s and Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin [14] proved a folk theorem.
But a theory that rests on the assumption that there is common knowledge of a su¢ cient statistic about all past behavior is, at best, incomplete. Such a theory is of little help in understanding behavior in groups in which there are idiosyncratic errors in individuals' observations of outcomes. 1 For many problems, it is more realistic to consider players who possess only partial information about the environment and, most importantly, players may not know the information possessed by other players. In such problems, players may communicate their partial information to other players in order to build a "consensus"regarding the current situation, which can be used to coordinate their future behavior. In this view, repeated games with public information can be thought of as a reduced form of a more complex interaction involving information sharing.
This point of view leads us to examine the robustness of equilibria with public monitoring when monitoring is private, but "close"to public monitoring. For example, one can think of a situation in which information contained in the public signal is dispersed among the players in the form of noisy private signals. If the amount of information contained in each player's private signal is negligible, then it is tempting to consider the game with such private signals and the underlying game with public signals as being "close." In this paper, we examine whether an equilibrium with public monitoring remains an equilibrium with respect to a public signal generated from private monitoring and communication, and whether (and how) players can be induced to reveal their private information.
To make these ideas precise, consider a public monitoring game (G; ) and a private monitoring game (G 0 ; p) ; where G and G 0 are normal form games with public monitoring and private monitoring respectively. In (G; ), each action pro…le a generates a public signal y from a set Y with probability (yja): In (G 0 ; p), each action pro…le a generates a private signal pro…le s = (s 1 ; ::; s n ) with probability p(sja): In our analysis of the private monitoring game (G 0 ; p), we will augment the model with a "public coordination device" that chooses a public coordinating signal (possibly randomly) from Y based on the reported pro…le of private signals. In this expanded game, players choose an action pro…le a, observe their private signals (s 1 ; ::; s n ), and publicly announce the (not necessarily honest) pro…le (s 0 1 ; ::; s 0 n ). A public coordinating signal y 2 Y is then selected with probability (yjs 0 1 ; ::; s 0 n ) : If the players report their private signals truthfully, then the probability that the realized public coordinating signal is y given a and is equal to p (yja) = P s2S (yjs)p(sja): We say that (G; ) and (G 0 ; p) are close when there exists a public coordinating device such that (yja) p (yja) and G and G 0 are close in terms of expected payo¤s. We call the private monitoring repeated game augmented by such public coordinating devices (which may change over time) a communication extension of the repeated game associated with (G 0 ; p) : We then ask the following question: for a given perfect public equilibrium of the repeated game with imperfect public monitoring associated with (G; ) and given the repeated game associated with any "close" private monitoring game (G 0 ; p), can we …nd a communication extension and an equilibrium in which players (i) truthfully reveal their signals along the equilibrium path and (ii) choose their actions as a function of the history of public coordinating signals according to ?
If revelation constraints can be ignored and players are assumed to announce their private signals truthfully, then it is straightforward to show that is an equilibrium with respect the public signal generated by as the game reduces to a repeated game of public monitoring G 0 ; p . Since G 0 is close to G and p is close to ; it is easy to show that remains an equilibrium of the repeated game of public monitoring game G 0 ; p if it is a uniformly strict equilibrium of the original repeated game of (G; ). Hence our analysis is mainly concerned with revelation constraints. The revelation of private information can be problematic, as can be seen in a simple trigger strategy equilibrium to support collusion. For a trigger strategy equilibrium to work, it is essential that every player reports "bad" outcomes honestly. However it is clear that players will not want to reveal any private information that may trigger mutual punishment.
We …nd that the following two concepts are the key to deal with the revelation constraints: informational size and distributional variability. Roughly speaking, player i is informationally small if for each action pro…le a, her private information is unlikely to have a large e¤ect on the distribution of the public coordinating signal p ( ja). Consequently, small informational size will imply that she will have little incentive to misreport her private signal in order to manipulate the other players' behavior to her advantage. Players are naturally informationally small in numerous settings. Suppose, for example, that there are many players whose signals are noisy observations of an underlying (but unobserved) common signal, and that these noisy observations are conditionally i.i.d.. If maps each signal pro…le into the posterior distribution of the unobserved signal, then each player is informationally small by the law of large numbers. Alternatively, with the same function , agents receiving conditionally i.i.d. signals of the unobserved signal would be informationally small if their signals are very precise, even if the number of players is small (but at least three). Distributional variability is an index that measures a correlation between a player's private signal and the public coordinating signal which she would expect when she reports her signal truthfully. If this index is large, that means that a player's conditional belief about the public coordinating signal varies widely with respect to her private information. The larger this index is, the easier it is to detect and punish a lie. With these concepts, our result can be stated as follows: a uniformly strict equilibrium is robust when, for some public coordination device, (1) (G 0 ; p) is close to (G; ) in the sense described above and (2) each player's informational size is small relative to her distributional variability.
The way to induce honest reporting is roughly as follows. Suppose that given perfect public equilibrium of the repeated game with imperfect public monitoring associated with (G; ) : If is employed in every period, then p (yja) is always close to (yja); but players may have an incentive to send false reports. To address this, we employ di¤erent public coordinating devices at di¤erent public histories h t jh t 2 H , where each h t is a perturbation of : When every player's informational size is small relative to her distributional variability, we can construct the collection h t jh t 2 H so that every revelation constraint is satis…ed on the equilibrium path (i.e. after an equilibrium action is played in the same period), while keeping each perturbation small enough so that the incentive to play the equilibrium action speci…ed by is not altered. The second main result of this paper is a new folk theorem for repeated games with private monitoring and communication. For the robustness result, we start with a public monitoring game, then consider nearby private monitoring games to check the robustness of equilibria for repeated games with public monitoring. For the folk theorem, we take the opposite path: we start with a private monitoring game, then generate public monitoring games via public coordinating devices. For repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, there is a well known technique to prove a folk theorem by Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin [14] . We exploit a connection between private monitoring games and public monitoring games via public coordination devices to import their technique into the domain of private monitoring games and extend it to incorporate revelation constraints. Again it is important for our result that every player is informationally small.
There are also several technical contributions in this paper. First, we can prove a uniformly strict folk theorem. That is, we prove a folk theorem by using uniformly strict equilibria in which every player experiences a uniform positive loss in payo¤ by deviating from the equilibrium action at any history. As a special case, this result implies a uniformly strict folk theorem for some class of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring. In a second technical contribution of the paper, which might be of independent interest, we provide a result corresponding to Theorem 4.1 in [14] without relying on their smoothness condition, which is commonly used to prove a folk theorem in the literature.
The model is described in Section 2 and the concepts of informational size and distributional variability are introduced in Section 3. Section 4 states and proves our robustness result. In Section 5, we prove a new folk theorem for repeated games with private monitoring and communication. Section 6 discusses the related literature. Some proofs are provided in the appendix (Section 7).
Preliminaries

Repeated Games with Public Monitoring
The set of players is N = f1; :::; ng. Player i chooses an action from a …nite set A i . An action pro…le is denoted by a = (a 1 ; :::; a n ) 2 i A i := A: Actions are not publicly observable, but the players observe a public signal from a …nite set Y: The probability that y 2 Y is realized given a 2 A is denoted (yja) : We do not assume full support. That is, the set fy 2 Y j (yja) > 0g can depend on a 2 A: This allows for perfect monitoring (Y = A and (yja) = 1 if y = a) as a special case. Player i 0 s stage game payo¤ is u i (a i ; y) and player i's expected stage game payo¤ is g i (a) = P y u i (a i ; y) (yja). Consequently, players do not obtain any additional information regarding the actions of other players from realized payo¤s. This stage game is denoted by (G; ) ; where G = (N; A; g). We normalize payo¤s so that each player's pure strategy minmax payo¤ is 0. Note that the mixed minmax payo¤ may be smaller than the pure strategy minmax payo¤. The set of feasible payo¤ pro…les is V = co fg (a) ja 2 Ag and V = fv 2 V jv 0g is the set of feasible, strictly individually rational payo¤ pro…les.
We now construct the repeated game associated with (G; ) : A private history for player i at stage t is denoted h t i = a 0 i ; :::; a t 1 i 2 H t i = A t i while a public history is denoted h t = y 0 ; :::; y t 1 2 H t = Y t with H 0 i = H 0 := f;g: A pure strategy for player i is a sequence i =
, where t i is a mapping from H t i H t to A i : The set of pure strategies for player i is denoted i : We restrict ourselves to pure strategies throughout this paper, so we will simply use the term strategy to refer to pure strategies when no confusion can arise. A strategy pro…le is denoted = f i g i2N 2 := i i . A pure strategy pro…le induces a probability measure on A 1 . Player i 0 s discounted expected payo¤ given and 2 (0; 1) is w
t E g i ã t j . 2 We denote this repeated game associated with (G; )
A strategy pro…le in G 1 ( ) is public if it only depends on H t . A pro…le of public strategies is a perfect public equilibrium (PPE) if, after every public history, the continuation (public) strategy pro…le constitutes a Nash equilibrium (Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin [14] ). Note that a perfect public equilibrium is a subgame perfect equilibrium when the stage game is one of perfect monitoring. Since we focus on perfect public equilibrium, we will omit the dependence of strategies on private histories and write t i h t instead of t i h t i ; h t : 3 Given ; and and a public history h t+1 = h t ; y 2 H t+1 = H t Y; let w ; i h t ; y denote player i's continuation payo¤ from period t+1: We de…ne uniformly strict perfect public equilibrium ( USPPE) as follows.
De…nition 1 A pure strategy perfect public equilibrium 2 for G 1 ( ) is uniformly strict if
This means that, at any public history, any player would lose at least by any unilateral one-shot deviation. This is stronger than requiring all incentive constraints to hold strictly. However, a strict PPE is uniformly strict for some > 0 if it can be represented by a …nite state automaton.
The Repeated Game with Private Monitoring and Its Public Communication Extension
Fix a stage game (G; ) with public monitoring as de…ned in the previous section. Consider a private monitoring game with the same set of players and the same action sets as those of G: Player i observes a private signal s i from a …nite set S i instead of the public signal. 4 A private signal pro…le is denoted s = (s 1 ; ::; s n ) 2 i S i := S: Player i 0 s stage game payo¤ is v i (a i ; s i ) and player i's expected stage game payo¤ is g 0 i (a) = P s v i (a i ; s i ) p (sja) where the conditional distribution on S given a is denoted p ( ja) : We assume that the marginal distributions have full support, that is,
denote the conditional probability of s i 2 S i given (a; s i ) : We denote this private monitoring stage game by (G 0 ; p); where G 0 = (N; A; g 0 ) : As in the case of the game (G; );we normalize payo¤s so that each player's pure strategy minmax payo¤ in (G 0 ; p) is 0. Let V (G 0 ) and V (G 0 ) denote the feasible payo¤ set and the set of individually rational and feasible payo¤s for G 0 : Discounted average payo¤s are de…ned as in the public monitoring case. Let G 01 p ( ) be the corresponding repeated game with private monitoring given 2 (0; 1) :
Players communicate directly each period. At the end of each period, players publicly announce a pro…le s 2 S. Then, a public coordinating device : S ! 4(Y ) generates public signal y 2 Y with probability (yjs): A convex combination of two public coordination devices and 0 is denoted by (1 ) + 0 ; which is de…ned by (1 ) + 0 (yjs) := (1 ) (yjs) + 0 (yjs) :
The distribution of the signal generated by given a with honest reporting is denoted by
We denote expectations with respect to p ( ja) by E [ ja]: Player i may not report her signal truthfully. Player i's reporting rule is a function : S i ! S i : Let R i be the set of all reporting rules for player i and i 2 R i be the honest reporting rule de…ned by i (s i ) = s i for all s i 2 S i : When player i uses a reporting rule i 2 R i , we will abuse notation and de…ne
as the distribution of the generated public signal given action pro…le a when i uses the reporting rule i and the other players report their private signals truthfully. We denote expectation with respect to p ( ja; i ) by E [ ja; i ]: Assuming honest reporting by players j 6 = i; player i's conditional belief regarding the realization of the public coordinating signal given action pro…le a, true type s i and rtype s 0 i is given by p yja; s i ; s
To economize on notation, we often use p (yja; s i ) for p (yja; s i ; s i ) so that, in particular, p (yja;
This formulation of communication is very special. A more general communication structure would allow for a mediator who receives and sends con…dential private information from and to the players 5 . There are two reasons for not introducing a mediator in this paper. First, a mediator plays no role in our robustness result (Section 4). We ask when a perfect public equilibrium for G 1 ( ) remains a perfect public equilibrium when players are engaged in a "close" private monitoring game (G 0 ; p) augmented with communication. As part of our notion of "closeness," we require that private signals in (G 0 ; p) can be aggregated so as to generate a public coordinating signal whose distribution is close to . Since public strategies can only depend on this public coordinating signal by de…nition, there is no role for con…dential announcements or con…dential recommendations. Second, the lack of a mediator only strengthens our folk theorem result (Section 5).
In the repeated game (G 0 ; p) augmented with communication as described above, a public history in period t consists of a sequence of realized public coordinating signals h t 2 Y t and a sequence of public announcements h t R 2 S t . We allow di¤erent coordinating devices to be employed at di¤erent h t 2 Y t . Given a private monitoring game (G 0 ; p) Notice that there is a natural one-to-one relationship between public strategies in G 1 ( ) and the action strategy components of public strategies in G 01 p ( ; ). Note also that we can ignore incentive constraints across di¤erent h t i ; h t R in G 01 p ( ; ) when every player uses a public strategy, as we can ignore incentive constraints across di¤erent h t i with public strategies for G 1 ( ) : We extend the standard de…nition of perfect public equilibrium to the public communication extension as follows: a strategy pro…le for the public communication extension is a perfect public equilibrium with communication (which we will refer to as PPE from now on) if is a pro…le of truthful public strategies and the continuation (public) strategy pro…le constitutes a Nash equilibrium at the beginning of every period. A strategy pro…le is uniformly strict perfect public equilibrium with communication if is a perfect public equilibrium and any player would lose at least in term of discounted average payo¤ at any moment when she deviates from the equilibrium action.
3 Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility
Distance between Stage Games
We focus on public monitoring games and private monitoring games that are close to each other. When we say "close", it means that a public monitoring game (G; ) and a private monitoring game (G 0 ; p) are close in two respects. First, g and g 0 are close. Second, there exists a public coordination device that can generate a public signal distribution close to : De…nition 2 Let (G 0 ; p) be a private monitoring game and (G; ) be a public monitoring game. Given any public coordinating device , we say that p is an " approximation of if max a ( ja) p ( ja) ": 6 (G 0 ; p; ) is an " approximation of (G; ) if p is an " approximation of and
The following is a canonical example of " approximation.
Example 1 Conditionally Independent Signals
Let e y denote a random variable that can take the values 0 or 1 with equal probability. There are n players (n odd). They do not observe the realization ofỹ but each observes a noisy private signal correlated with e y. Speci…cally, ifỹ = y, then player i observes a private signal s i 2 S i = f0; 1g, which agrees with y with probability 2 1 2 ; 1 and di¤ ers from y with probability 1
: These private signals are conditionally independent. Suppose that all players report their private signals (s 1 ; ::; s n ) simultaneously and truthfully and (1js 1 ; ::; s n ) = 1 if the majority of the players announce 1 while (0js 1 ; ::; s n ) = 0 if the majority of the players announce 0: 7 Clearly the distribution on f0; 1g generated this way is a good approximation of 6 k k is the Euclidean norm. 7 The generated public signal is the maximum likelihood estimate of the true realization of e y in this example.
the original distribution of e y when is su¢ ciently close to 1 or when the number of players is su¢ ciently large.
Since our notion of approximation is relatively loose, it may happen that two seemingly di¤erent monitoring structures are close to each other. For example, Y and S i can be be di¤erent sets. As an another example, consider the following monitoring structure.
Example 2 Perfectly Complementary Information
Suppose that Y = f0; 1g and S i = f0; 1g and let be the distribution of a hidden signal on Y: There are six players. The distribution p of private signals on S satis…es the following. When the true value of the hidden signal is 1; the private signal pro…le is such that three players receive signal 0 and three players receive signal 1, and each such pro…le of signals is equally likely. When the true value of the hidden signal is 0; the private signal pro…le is either (1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1) or (0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0) ; each with probability 1 2 : Consider a public coordination mechanism such that (0js) = 0 if at least …ve players announce the same signal and (0js) = 1 otherwise. Then p is a 0 approximation of : 8 In this example, each player is equally likely to observe 0 or 1 for any realization of the underlying signal. Hence her signal alone provides no information about the true value of the underlying signal, yet the aggregated private signals completely reveals the true underlying signal.
In this example (or Example 1 with = 1 and n 3); one player's information does not a¤ect the generated public signal at all. Following Postlewaite and Schmeidler [31] , we say that a pair (p; ) is nonexclusive when p (yja; i ) = p (yja) for any a; y, i and i:
Informational Size, Distributional Variability, and One-Shot Revelation Game
We turn to the issue of truthful revelation of private information in this subsection. Although our main interest is in repeated games, it is useful to consider the following simple one-shot information revelation game …rst. Fix any private monitoring game (G 0 ; p). For any public coordination device , any pro…le of payo¤ functions w : Y ! R n , and any a 2 A; the one-shot information revelation game (G 0 ; p; ; w; a) is de…ned as follows. Player i observes a private signal s i , which is distributed according to p (sja). Players report s 0 , then a public coordinating signal y is generated 8 We need six players for this example. Suppose that there are only …ve players. Either (1; 1; 1; 1; 1) or (0; 0; 0; 0; 0) is observed with probability 1 2 given y = 0: Given y = 1; no signal pro…le with at most one 0 or 1 is observed with positive probability and every other pro…le is observed with positive probability (= 1 20 ). In this case, when (1; 1; 1; 1; 0) is observed, we cannot tell whether the last player is lying given y = 0 or one of the …rst four players is lying given y = 1. with probability (yjs 0 ). Finally, player i receives payo¤ w i (y) if the realized value of the public signal is y. In the context of repeated games, this payo¤ will be interpreted as player i's continuation payo¤. Consequently, (G 0 ; p; ; w; a) de…nes a game of incomplete information in which a strategy for player i is a function i : S i ! S i and truthful reporting is an equilibrium if for each i, X
for each s i ; s 0 i 2 S i : When do players have incentive to report their private signals truthfully in this game? To …x ideas, consider the extreme case in which (p; ) is nonexclusive. Then no player has an incentive to lie because what she reports is irrelevant and does not a¤ect the generated public signal at all. Hence honest reporting can be implemented in a one-shot revelation game for any speci…cation of the payo¤ function and any action when (p; ) is nonexclusive.
We wish to generalize this simple observation. In general, it should become "easier"to induce honest reporting as each player's in ‡uence on the public coordinating signal becomes "smaller."The following index measures the size of this in ‡uence for each player. This means that, conditional on (s i ; a) ; player i 0 s updated probability that she manipulate the public signal distribution by more than v i (s i ; s 0 i ; a) by announcing
Note that there may be a trade-o¤ between keeping each player's informational size small and approximating a particular public signal distribution. Suppose that only player 1 is perfectly informed regarding the realization ofỹ in Example 1, i.e.
Of course, a player's informational size alone is not enough to induce honest reporting. Since players may still have incentive to misreport their signals, however small it is, we need to introduce some scheme to punish dishonest reporting. So we consider the following mechanism design problem: given that a 2 A is played, …nd a public coordination device 0 that generates approximately the same distribution as p ( ja) and makes truthful reporting a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for the one-shot revelation game G 0 ; p; 0 ; w; a . For this purpose, we construct a certain scoring rule that relies on a player's distributional variability.
De…nition 4 (Distributional Variability)
This measures the extent to which player i's conditional (normalized) beliefs regarding the public coordinating signal are di¤erent given s i and s 0 i (assuming honest reporting by others). This is always close to 1 in Example 1 if is large and is always equal to 0 in Example 2. We use this variation of player i's beliefs to induce her to report her private signals truthfully. 9 
Intuitively, it must be easier to induce players to report their private signals truthfully when the …rst indices are smaller and the second indices are larger. Indeed, it is the ratio of these two indexes at each (s i ; s 0 i ; a) that is signi…cant for truthful revelation . For example, p is 0 regular if (p; ) is nonexclusive. When we say a player is informationally small, we mean that the ratio of her informational size to her distributional variability given every (s i ; s 0 i ; a) in this sense. We can now prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1 For any private monitoring game (G 0 ; p) and any 2 (0; 1) ; there exists a > 0 such that the following holds: if p is regular for some ; then for any a 2 A and any payo¤ function w : Y ! R n ; there exists a public coordination device 0 a;w : S ! 4 (Y ) such that truthful reporting is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium 9 Our distributional variability is similar, but di¤erent from the condition with the same name in McLean and Postlewaite [25] . Our condition measures the distance between a player's conditional belief regarding the aggregated public signal, whereas their condition measures the distance between a player's conditional belief about the other players's private signals, i.e.
(there is no action in [25] This theorem means that honest reporting can be induced for any one-shot revelation game by perturbing slightly. Furthermore, small values of will typically require small values of . Also note that depends on but is independent of the payo¤ function and the underlying action. These properties will be important when this result is applied to repeated games. It is natural that is independent of a, since regularity requires a certain property across all actions. Furthermore, is independent of w for the following reason. We construct a punishment for misreporting one's signal by perturbing slightly so that the distribution of the generated signal remains similar, but incentive compatibility is preserved. When w is large, the temptation to deviate may be large, but the size of the associated punishment is also proportionately large. Consequently, the size of w does not matter.
This theorem is similar to Theorem 1 in McLean and Postlewaite [25] . However, there is a di¤erence between our result and the result in [25] . In [25] , each player's preference is given by u i (x; ) ; where is an unobservable payo¤ relevant parameter and x is an allocation, so it is important that the true is recovered almost surely ("negligible uncertainty") to implement an allocation function x : 7 ! x ( ) approximately. Here, there is no analogue of .
When is p likely to be regular? Consider a more general version of Example 1 with conditionally independent signals. De…nition 6 A private monitoring game (G 0 ; p) is called a perturbation of the public monitoring game (G; ) if S i = Y for all i; v i (a i ; y) = u i (a i ; y) for all (a; y) and i; and there exists q i ( jy) 2 4 (S i ) for all y and i such that p(sja) = P y2Y Q i q i (s i jy) (yja) and q i (yjy) for any y and i.
Suppose that (G 0 ; p) is a perturbation of (G; ) : Let M be the "majority rule", which is a public coordination device that chooses y reported by the largest number of players (with some tie-breaking rule). Then
and p M can generate almost the same signal distribution as as ! 1: It follows that (G 0 ; p) is an " approximation of (G; ) for any given " if is close enough to one. Furthermore, player i's maximum informational size v i (s i ; a) converges to 0 given any (s i ; a) as long as n 3 and player i's minimum distributional variability i (s i ; a) converges to a positive constant given any (s i ; a) as ! 1 for every i 2 N: The following proposition summarizes this observation.
Proposition 1 Fix a public monitoring game (G; ) with n 3: For any " > 0 and > 0; there exists 2 (0; 1) and a public coordination device such that, for every -perturbation (G 0 ; p) of (G; ) ; (G 0 ; p; ) is an " approximation of (G; ) and p is regular:
Robustness of PPE
Consider any (G; ). In this section, we ask the following question: if is a PPE of G 1 ( ) ; when can we …nd a reporting strategy so that ( ; ) is a PPE of G 01 p ( ; ) with the help of some public communication device ?
The answer is again simple in some extreme cases. Let be a public coordination device for which p is an " approximation of ; and suppose that (p; ) is nonexclusive. Let = f h t : h t 2 Y t ; t 0; g be the public communication device with h t = for all t and all h t . In this case, incentive compatibility is an immediate consequence of nonexclusive information. Essentially, we simply have another repeated game with public monitoring where the stage game payo¤s and the public signal distribution are slightly perturbed. Therefore every uniformly strict PPE of (G; ) is an 0 uniformly strict PPE of G 01 p ( ; ) for some positive 0 as long as " is small enough. This follows from the observation (which is formally demonstrated in the proof of Theorem 2) that continuation payo¤s in G 01 p ( ; ) converge to continuation payo¤s in G 1 ( ) uniformly across all public histories and all public strategies as " ! 0:
Our robustness result generalizes this observation by relaxing nonexclusivity.
De…nition 7 An uniformly strict perfect public equilibrium of G 1 ( ) is strictly robust with respect to (G 0 ; p) if there exists a public communication device and a reporting strategy such that = ( ; ) is an 0 uniformly strict truthful PPE of G 01 p ( ; ) for some 0 > 0:
Theorem 2 Fix 2 (0; 1) and a public monitoring game (G; ) : For any > 0; there exist ; " > 0 such that every uniformly strict PPE of G 1 ( ) is strictly robust with respect to any (G 0 ; p) for which there exists such that (G 0 ; p; ) is an "-approximation of (G; ) and p is -regular:
Proof. See Appendix C.
According to this theorem, an uniformly strict PPE of G 1 ( ) is robust if it is an 0 uniformly strict PPE of G 01 p ( ; ) for some public communication device and some positive 0 if, for some public coordinating device , (G 0 ; p) is close to (G; ) in the sense that p is an " approximation of and p is -regular for small enough " and :
Note that and " only depend on but not on a particular equilibrium strategy. To understand the structure of our proof, suppose that is a uniformly strict perfect public equilibrium in G 1 ( ) : If (G 0 ; p; ) is an " approximation of (G; ) and if players were constrained to truthfully reveal their signals so that incentive compatibility is not an issue, then the public communication device = f h t : h t 2 Y t ; t 0; g with h t = for all t will su¢ ce to induce an equilibrium in the game with communication. Since one-shot deviations from are not pro…table in G 1 ( ) ; they remain unpro…table in G 01 p ( ; ) as long as " is small since, as we have mentioned, continuation payo¤s in G 01 p ( ; ) are close to the continuation payo¤s in G 1 ( ) uniformly across all public histories and all public strategies:Hence, the action strategy de…nes an equilibrium in G 01 p ( ; ) : Since players are not constrained to report truthfully, we must construct a more sophisticated public communication device that induces them to do so. To begin, suppose that is a public communication device and = ( ; ) is a truthful strategy in G 01 p ( ; ) : Note that need not be an equilibrium strategy in G 01 p ( ; ) : However, ; together with ; induces a set of continuation functions fw (h t ; ) : h t 2 Y t ; t 0g. Our proof proceeds in two parts. First, we modify the device so that .... Given h t 2 H t ; we must now consider two types of deviation by player i in period t. First, it must be optimal for i to truthfully reveal his signal s i when s is the realized signal pro…le after agents have chosen the action pro…le h t . Second, we require that a joint deviation in action and report is not pro…table. Suppose that t 0, a = h t and y 7 ! w (h t ; y) = w (y) is the continuation payo¤ for i from period t + 1 onward. To deal with the …rst type of deviation, we can apply Theorem 1 to perturb slightly and induce honest reporting: for any 2 (0; 1) ; there exists a > 0 such that, if p is regular, then truthful reporting is optimal for every player in a one-shot revelation game (G 0 ; p; (1 ) + 0 a ;w ; w ; a ) for some
We also need to prevent a joint action-report deviation within each period. To deal with this, we choose a su¢ ciently small (with an associated su¢ ciently small so as to apply Theorem 1) and a su¢ ciently small " so that p is a good approximation of p ; hence a good approximation of ; independent of the speci…cation of 0 a ;w if players report their signals truthfully. Observe that each player's reported signal has negligible in ‡uence on when " is small. Hence, p is also good approximation of whether a player lies or not, as long as she is informationally small. Therefore,
When (G 0 ; p; ) is a close to (G;
Therefore, a joint deviation by player i in action and report is not pro…table in period t given history h t :
Summarizing the argument to this point, we began with an arbitrary public communication device and, given the induced set of continuation functions fw (h t ; ) : h t 2 Y t ; t 0g; we have constructed a new public communication device
and a somewhat subtle issue arises. If = ( ; ) is a truthful strategy in G 01 p ( ; F ( )) then need not be an equilibrium strategy in G 01 p ( ; F ( )) despite the way that the device F ( ) was constructed. This is due to the fact that the system of continuation payo¤s fw 0 (h t ; ) : h t 2 Y t ; t 0g induced by in G 01 p ( ; F ( )) need not be the same as the system fw (h t ; ) : h t 2 Y t ; t 0g with which we began. If F ( ) = ; then would indeed be an equilibrium strategy in G 01 p ( ; F ( )) and our proof would be complete. This suggests a …xed point argument and, in the second part of the proof, we apply the Fan-Glicksburg Theorem to deduce the existence of a public communication device satisfying F ( ) = and for which = ( ; ) is an equilibrium strategy in G 01
The class of perturbations of the public monitoring game (G; ) provide a particularly natural framework in which to pose the robustness problem. A combination of Proposition 1 and Theorem 2 immediately implies that every uniformly strict equilibrium of a public monitoring repeated game is robust with respect to any perturbations of the public monitoring game for small enough :
Corollary 1 Fix a public monitoring game (G; ) with n 3 and 2 (0; 1) : For every > 0; there exists 0 > 0 such that, for each 2 (0; 0 ); every uniformly strict perfect public equilibrium of G 1 ( ) is strictly robust with respect to any perturbation of (G; ) :
It is instructive to compare Theorem 2 with stronger notion of robustness of PPE in G 1 ( ) : To make the idea precise, let (G; ) be a game with public monitoring and de…ne the "-perturbation class " (G; ) of (G; ) as follows:
is an "-approximation of (G; )g
As a consequence of Proposition 1, it follows that " (G; ) 6 = ? for all " if n 3:
We will say that a PPE of G 1 ( ) is " robust if for every (G 0 ; p; ) 2 " (G; ); there exists a public communication device and a truthful reporting strategy such that = ( ; ) is a PPE of G 01 p ( ; ) : In terms of "-robustness, a stronger continuity result would be stated as follows: for every > 0; there exists an " > 0 such that every -uniformly strict PPE of G 1 ( ) is "-robust. The statement of our Theorem 2 is close to, but not quite the same as, this stronger notion of robustness. To show that every -uniformly strict PPE of G 1 ( ) remains a component of PPE in G 01 p ( ; ) for some public communication device ; we require the existence of a coordination mechanism for which (G 0 ; p; ) is an "-approximation of (G; ); i.e., we require that (G 0 ; p; ) 2 " (G; ): However, Theorem 2 also requires that satisfy an additional condition: the informational size must be enough small relative to the distributional variability, i.e. p is regular. Finally, we mention another interpretation of our theorem. The existence of a nontrivial equilibrium in repeated games with private monitoring is a di¢ cult problem. An ostensibly easier problem is that of the existence of correlated or communication equilibrium. Our theorem says that, under certain circumstances, we can construct a certain type of communication equilibrium for a repeated game with private monitoring if it is "close"to a game with public monitoring in a certain sense.
Folk Theorem
The previous section focuses on the robustness of PPE in public monitoring games and touches upon private monitoring games mainly as their approximations. In this section, our main target is the repeated game with private monitoring itself; we prove a new folk theorem for repeated games with private monitoring and communication when players are informationally small. We exploit a connection between public monitoring games and private monitoring games and adapt some standard techniques for a public-monitoring folk theorem to the domain of private monitoring games.
Our folk theorem asserts the following. Suppose that for some public coordination device for (G 0 ; p) the associated p satis…es a certain condition that guarantees a folk theorem in the repeated game with public monitoring game (G 0
To state the theorem more precisely, we need to clarify the "certain condition" to which we have alluded in the previous paragraph. Given any public signal distribution ; let T i (a) R jY j be de…ned as
The set T i (a) consists of those distributional changes that player i can induce by choosing a strategy di¤erent from a i when the remaining players choose a i : The set b T i (a) consists of all feasible distributional changes that player i can induce. We say that a public signal distribution satis…es distinguishability at a 2 A if for each pair of distinct players i and j, the following conditions are satis…ed:
We say that satis…es distinguishability if it satis…es distinguishability at every a 2 A. (1) means that a unilateral deviation by player i or player j must be statistically detectable. (2) and (3) are conditions regarding the distinguishability of player i's deviation and player j's deviation. It is known that these conditions are su¢ cient for a folk theorem for repeated games with public monitoring. 11 Now we can state our folk theorem. Let E ( ; ; ) R n be the set of uniformly strict PPE payo¤ pro…les of G 01 p ( ; ) given and .
Theorem 3 Fix any private monitoring game (G
and there exists such that p is distinguishable. Then there exists a > 0 such that, if p is regular; then the following holds: for each v 2 intV (G 0 ), there exists an > 0 and a 2 (0; 1) such that, for each 2 ( ; 1) ; there exists a public 1 0 coX denote the convex hull of X in R n : 1 1 These conditions guarantee that the incentive constraints of player i and j are satis…ed simultaneously by using appropriate transfers (=continuation payo¤s) even when their transfers are required to lie on any hyperplane. They are parallel to (A2) and (A3) in Kandori and Matsushima [18] . Note that depends only on the underlying stage game (G 0 ; p) but not on v. On the other hand, depends on v; while depends on both v and : 12 Remark.
The assumption intV (G
is not full-dimensional, we may strengthen the distinguishability condition to prove the same result. To prove this theorem, for each a 2 A and q 2 R n such that kqk = 1 and jq i j < 1 for all i; we construct x :
is not full dimensional, the range of x needs to be the a¢ ne space that contains V (G 0 ); instead of R n : This additional restriction can be addressed by strengthening the distinguishability condition. The bottom line is that every proof goes through if we restrict our attention to the a¢ ne space that contains V (G 0 ): 13 See Fudenberg, Levine and Takahashi [15] for the characterization of the limit equilibrium payo¤ when V (G 0 ) is not full dimensional.
Is a folk theorem obvious given our robustness result? Take any private monitoring game (G 0 ; p) for which there exists such that p satis…es distinguishability. Why not prove a folk theorem with uniformly strict PPE for some > 0 for the public monitoring repeated game with G 0 ; p (which is not di¢ cult to do) and apply our robustness result? However, this approach is not satisfactory because we need to tailor the informational size to each target equilibrium payo¤ pro…le and given discount factor to do so, i.e. depends on both v and : The strength of the above folk theorem is that we can …nd a …xed size of informational smallness for which the folk theorem is obtained, rather than including as a parameter that depends on each payo¤ pro…le in the statement of the folk theorem.
Overview of Proof
We prove our folk theorem in several steps. Some proofs are provided in the appendix.
Self Decomposability with Private Monitoring and Public Coordinating Device
In the following, a private monitoring game (G 0 ; p) is …xed. Rather than analyzing the repeated game directly, we begin by decomposing discounted average payo¤s of a repeated game into current payo¤s and continuation payo¤s, and then analyze a collection of one-shot revelation games.
For a public monitoring game (G; ); an action pro…le a 2 A is said to be enforceable with respect to W R n and 2 (0; 1) if there exists a function w : Y ! W such that
for some enforceable action a and w : Y ! W; then we say that v is decomposable with respect to W and : Let B ( ; W ) be the set of payo¤ pro…les that are decomposable with respect to W and : It is a known result that, if any bounded set W 0 is self decomposable i.e. W 0 B ( ; W 0 ) ; then every payo¤ in B ( ; W 0 ) (hence in W 0 ) can be supported by a PPE (Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti [1] ).
We now extend these ideas to the private monitoring game (G 0 ; p) with public coordination devices. Recall that, given action pro…le a 2 A; E [ ja] denotes expectation with respect to p ( ja); E [ ja; i ] denotes expectation with respect to p ( ja; i ) and i : S i ! S i denotes the honest reporting rule for player i de…ned by
De…nition 8 An action pro…le a 2 A is
enforceable with respect to W R n and 2 (0; 1) if there exists a public coordinating device : S ! (Y ) and w : Y ! W such that for all i 2 N;
The inequality (i) means that a player would lose more than when deviating from a: Inequality (ii) means that dishonest reporting is not pro…table after a is played. If a 2 A is enforceable with respect to W and with some vand w and
; then we say that the triple (a; ; w) enforces v with respect to W and . We say that v is decomposable with respect to W and when there exists a triple (a; ; w) that enforces v with respect to W and : Next de…ne the set of decomposable payo¤s with respect to W and as follows. B ( ; W; ) := fv 2 R n jv is decomposable with respect to W and g:
We say that W is self decomposable with respect to 2 (0; 1) if W B ( ; W; ) : It is easy to see that a "uniformly strict"version of Theorem 1 in Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti [1] holds here when > 0: if W is self decomposable with respect to ; then every v 2 W can be supported by a uniformly strict PPE of G 01 p ( ; ) for some public communication device . Note that each payo¤ pro…le may need to be supported by using a di¤erent public coordinating device. Hence di¤erent public coordinating devices need to be used at di¤erent public histories. Since the following lemma is a straightforward implication of the result in Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti [1] , its proof is omitted.
Lemma 1 If W R n is bounded and self decomposable with respect to 2 (0; 1), then for any v 2 W; there exists such that v 2 E ( ; ; ).
Local Decomposability is Enough
Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin [14] showed that local self decomposability is su¢ cient for self decomposability of any convex, compact set for large . Here we prove the corresponding lemma in our setting. First, we prove a lemma that establishes a certain monotonicity property of B: The Lemma implies that, if W is self decomposable with respect to 2 (0; 1) ; then W is 
Since W is compact, there exists a …nite subcollection fU v k g K k=1 that covers W: De…ne = max k=1;:::;K f v k g and = min k=1;:::;K v k . Then
Lemma 2 and the convexity of W imply that
for any 2 ( ; 1) and for k = 1; :::; K: Consequently,
Proving Local Decomposability
Given Lemma 1 and Lemma 3, the proof of Theorem 3 will be complete if, for every individually rational and feasible payo¤ pro…le v 2 intV (G 0 ); we can …nd a compact, convex, locally self decomposable set that contains it. We call a set in R n smooth if it is closed and convex with an interior point in R n and there exists the unique tangent hyperplane at every boundary point. 14 Since any such v can be contained in some smooth set in intV (G 0 ), we are done if we can show that every smooth set in intV (G 0 ) is locally self decomposable. Hence the following lemma completes the proof of Theorem 3.
Lemma 4 Fix a private monitoring game (G 0 ; p) : Suppose that there exists such that p is distinguishable. Then there exists a > 0 such that, if p is regular, then every smooth set W intV (G) is locally strictly self decomposable.
Proof. See appendix D.
To prove this, we follow the argument of Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin [14] in Theorem 4.1. Suppose that we can induce players to report their private signals truthfully. Then the stage game is essentially a public monitoring game G 0 ; p : In this case, we can show that almost every boundary point v on a smooth set W intV (G) is decomposable with respect to the hyperplane that is parallel to the tangent hyperplane at v if p satis…es distinguishability. Since we need to induce truthful reporting at the same time, we need to strengthen this requirement and show that every such boundary point v is strictly decomposable. We then perturb and continuation payo¤s slightly as in the previous section so that these boundary points remain strictly decomposable and every player has an incentive to report honestly. This can be done when every player is informationally small.
A few comments are in order. First, it may be of some technical interest that we prove this step using some smoothness condition that is weaker than the one in [14] , which is commonly invoked to prove a folk theorem in the literature. Second, we choose independent of the target payo¤ pro…les as we emphasized. Third, it may not possible to obtain strict decomposability when the continuation payo¤s lie on the tangent hyperplane that is not "regular"(i.e. it is "vertical"or "horizontal"; all the coe¢ cients except one are 0) because the continuation payo¤s are constant for some player. In this case, we obtain strict decomposability by choosing continuation payo¤s from a half space bounded away from the target payo¤ pro…le. Finally, our result clearly implies that a uniformly strict folk theorem is obtained for repeated games with imperfect public monitoring when distinguishability is satis…ed, because there is no incentive constraint regarding the revelation of private information in this case.
Related Literature and Discussion
There is a large literature on repeated games with private monitoring and communication. Most papers in the literature focus on a folk theorem rather than robustness. Our approach to folk theorem is similar to Ben-Porath and Kahneman [6] . They prove a folk theorem when a player's action is perfectly observed by at least two other players. For each individually rational and feasible payo¤ pro…le, they …x a strategy to support it with perfect monitoring, then augment it with a reporting strategy to support the same payo¤ pro…le with direct communication. Their strategies employ draconian punishments when a player's announcement is inconsistent with others' announcements ("shoot the deviator"). Our paper di¤ers from their paper in many respects. Firstly, our paper uses not only perfect monitoring but also imperfect public monitoring as a benchmark. Secondly, private signals can be noisy in our paper. Aoyagi [4] proves a Nash-threat folk theorem in a setting similar to Ben-Porath and Kahneman [6] , but with noisy private monitoring. In his paper, each player is monitored by a subset of players. Private signals are noisy, but re ‡ect the action of the monitored player very accurately when they are jointly evaluated. That is, private monitoring is jointly almost perfect. In his paper, players have access to a more general communication device than ours, namely, mediated communication. Tomala [35] introduces a concept called perfect communication equilibrium and proves a folk theorem with private monitoring and mediated communication. Compte [8] and Kandori and Matsushima [18] provide general su¢ cient conditions for a folk theorem with noisy private monitoring and with direct communication like us. Our su¢ cient conditions are di¤erent from their conditions. Compte [8] assumes that players' private signals are independent conditional on action pro…les. This condition is not satis…ed by any -perturbation of public monitoring game, to which our Proposition 1 and Theorem 3 apply. Obara [28] …nds a su¢ cient condition to extend Compte [8] 's result to the case where private signals are correlated. Kandori and Matsushima [18] assume that, among others, a deviation by one player and a deviation by another player can be statistically distinguished based on the private signals of the remaining players. This condition is similar to, but di¤erent from our condition (2) and (3). Their condition and our condition impose the same restriction on the set of probability measures, but they impose it on the marginal distributions of private signals for each subset of n 2 players, whereas we impose it on the public signal distribution that is approximated by the private signal distribution via some public coordination device. Fudenberg and Levine [12] prove a folk theorem for repeated games with private monitoring and communication when private monitoring is almost perfect messaging. Our folk theorem allows for more general perturbations, but their result (as well as Obara [28] 's) applies to the two player games unlike our results. Anderlini and Laguno¤ [3] consider dynastic repeated games with communication where short-lived players care about their o¤springs. As in our paper, players may have an incentive to conceal bad information so that future generations do not su¤er from mutual punishments. Their model is based on perfect monitoring and their focus is on characterizing the equilibrium payo¤ set rather than establishing the robustness of equilibria or proving a folk theorem.
Mailath and Morris [21] study robustness of PPE when a public monitoring structure is perturbed slightly, but without any communication. One of the assumptions they need for robustness is that private monitoring is almost public. Private monitoring is almost public if S i = Y for all i and jPr (s = (y; :::; y) ja) (yja)j is small for all a and y. In a subsequent work, Mailath and Morris [22] introduced a weaker notion of approximation called "-closeness, which does not assume S i = Y . Their de…nition of "-closeness (see De…nition 2 in [22] ) implies that max a;y jPr (8i; f i (s i ) = yja) (yja)j " for all a and y given some f i : S i ! Y f;g ; i 2 N; which map private signals to a public signal. While we allow communication for our robustness result, our notion of closeness is weaker. In Example 2, p is a 0 approximation of and is 0 regular, but it is not close to in their sense. Furthermore, we can show that, when p is " close to in their sense, there exists a public coordination device such that p is "(jY j + 1) approximation of . 15 They show that a certain class of PPE without bounded recall is not robust to small perturbations of public monitoring. Since there exist uniformly strict PPE within this class that are robust in our sense with respect to more general perturbations, our result suggests that communication is essential for the robustness of a certain class of PPE. Mailath and Morris [21] also prove a folk theorem for general repeated games with almost-perfect and almost-public private monitoring without any communication. 16 The notion of informational size and distributional variability appear in McLean and Postlewaite [25] , although our formulation is slightly di¤erent as already mentioned.
There is an extensive literature on repeated games with private monitoring without communication, starting with Sekiguchi [33] . Bhaskar and Obara [7] , Ely and Välimäki [9] , Piccione [29] prove a folk theorem for a repeated prisoners'dilemma game with private almost-perfect monitoring. The most successful approach to private monitoring games, which is taken by [9] and [29] , is to rely on a class of equilibria 1 5 To see this, let S(y) := fsjfi(si) = y for all ig and de…ne
it follows that
called Belief-free equilibria. 17 ' 18 Belief-free equilibrium is formalized and generalized by Ely, Hörner and Olszewski [16] . Its limit payo¤ characterization is …rst given by [16] , then improved by Yamamoto [37] . In general, belief-free equilibrium does not deliver a folk theorem except for the special game such as prisoners'dilemma. Various extensions of belief-free equilibrium have been proposed and successfully applied to prove a folk theorem for more general games. Matsushima [24] employs Belief-free review strategies to prove a folk theorem for a repeated prisoner's dilemma game with conditionally independent noisy private monitoring, which is neither almost perfect nor almost public. 19 Hörner and Olszewski [16] also uses a type of belieffree review strategies to prove a folk theorem for general stage games with private almost-perfect monitoring. Sugaya [33] pushes this idea of belief-free review strategies further and proves a folk theorem for general stage games with noisy private monitoring when the signal spaces are large enough. Kandori [17] introduces a notion of weakly belief-free equilibrium that includes belief-free equilibrium as a special case. Finally, Miyagawa, Miyahara, and Sekiguchi [26] consider private monitoring games where each player can observe the other players'actions perfectly with some cost, and proves a folk theorem without any assumption on imperfect monitoring structure. 1 7 However, the Belief-based approach by [7] also has been studied and re…ned in recent papers such as Phelan and Skrzypacz [31] and Kandori and Obara [20] . 1 8 A type of belief-free equilibrium has also appeared in the context of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring in Kandori and Obara [19] . 1 9 For an extension of Matsushima's construction to N player games, see Yamamoto [36] .
Appendix
A. Preliminary Lemma
Here we prove several useful lemmas. First we derive a few upper bounds on player i's ability to manipulate the distribution of a public coordinating signal.
Lemma
The next lemma provides an upper bound on player i's distributional variability.
Lemma 6
i s i ; s
Proof. Fix a private monitoring game (G 0 ; p) and 2 (0; 1) : Pick any payo¤ function w : Y ! R n and a 2 A: Without loss of generality, we will assume that min y2Y w i (y) = 0 for all i 2 N: First we de…ne a public coordination device That is i;w is a distribution on Y that maximizes player i's expected value of w i and i;w is a distribution that minimizes player i's expected value of w i . Finally, de…ne We prove the following claim. Note that this completes the proof of Theorem 1 because is chosen independent of w and a:
Claim: Suppose that
If p is regular, then truthful reporting is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the one-shot information revelation game G 0 ; p; a;w ; w; a :
Proof of Claim: We will prove that, if satis…es the condition of the claim and if p is regular, then X
for each i 2 N and each s i ; s 0 i 2 S i : Let w i = max y2Y w i (y) and note w i 0 since min y2Y w i (y) = 0:
We prove this claim in four steps. In Step 1, we derive a lower bound for player i's expected loss from misreporting that comes from 
where the …nal inequality follows from Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 and the CauchySchwartz inequality.
Step 2: We claim that X
To see this, note that X
where the …nal inequality follows from Lemma 5.
Step 3: We claim that, if j 6 = i; then X
Step 4: Combining Steps 1-3, it follows that X
Finally, note that
It follows immediately that X
for any s i ; s 0 i if p is regular for any satisfying
C. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Let (G; ) and (G 0 ; p) be a public monitoring game and a private monitoring game respectively. De…ne as follows
The discount factor is …xed throughout the proof.
Step 1: Continuation payo¤s are close with truthful reporting when stage games are uniformly close.
Claim: Suppose that 2 is a public strategy in G 1 ( ) ; = f h t : h t 2 Y t ; t 0g is a public communication device, = ( ; ) is a truthful strategy in G 01 ( ; ) ; and (G 0 ; p; h t ) is an " approximation of (G; ) for every h t 2 : We claim that
where (abusing notation)
denotes player i's continuation payo¤s after h t in G 1 ( ) given and
denotes player i's continuation payo¤s after h t in G 01 ( ; ) given .
Proof : Suppose that 2 is a public strategy in G 1 ( ) ; is a public communication device and = ( ; ) is a truthful strategy in G 01 ( ; ) : Choose any " > 0 and suppose that (G 0 ; p; h t ) is an " approximation of (G; ) for each h t 2 : Let B = sup i;h t w i h t w i h t < 1: For each public history h t ; we obtain
Computing the supremum of the left hand side, we obtain B (1 ) "+ p jY j "+ B from which it follows that
and the proof of the claim is complete.
Step 2: Constructing the public communication device Claim: Choose any 2 (0; 1) : If satis…es (4) and if is a public coordinating device for which p is regular, then for any pure strategy PPE of G 1 ( ); there exists a collection of public coordinating devices f h t : h t 2 Y t ; t 0g, a public communication device = f(1 ) + h t : h t 2 Y t ; t 0g and a truthful strategy pro…le = (( 1 ; 1 ); ::; ( n ; n )) for G 01 p ( ; ) such that, for each public history h t ; truthful reporting is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the one-shot information revelation game
where fw(h t ) : h t 2 Y t ; t 0g is the collection of continuation payo¤s in G 01 p ( ; ) generated by the truthful strategy pro…le :
Proof: As in the proof of Theorem 1, let
and for any pair of probability distributions i ; i 2 4 (Y ) ; let 
de…ne a public communication device as follows:
For each i, choose a reporting strategy i so that i = ( i ; i ) is truthful. Then the strategy pro…le and the public communication device ( ; ) de…ne continuation payo¤s in the game G 01 p ( ; ( ; )) at every public history. For each 2 M; let w i h t ; ; denote player i's continuation payo¤ in G 01 p ( ; ( ; )) at public history for all h t 2 Y t and i 2 N: We will now show that the correspondence : M ! M has a …xed point by applying the Fan-Glicksberg …xed point theorem. First, let X denote the Cartesian product of countably many copies of R 2njY j indexed by H := [ t 0 Y t . Since R 2njY j is a locally convex topological vector space, it follows that X is a locally convex topological vector space with respect to the product topology. (Theorem 5.1 and Lemma 5.54 in Aliprantis and Border [2] ). Since K R 2njY j is nonempty, convex and compact, we conclude that M is a nonempty, convex, compact subset of X in the product topology.
Clearly is nonempty, convex valued, and compact valued. So we need only verify that is upper hemicontinuous. Upper hemicontinuity will follow from Berge's Theorem if we can establish that 7 ! w i (h t ; y); ; is a continuous real valued function on M for each t and h t 2 Y t since the product of upper hemicontinuous correspondences from M to K is upper hemicontinuous with respect to the product topology on X (to prove the last assertion, modify the argument of Theorem 16.28 in [2] ). To see that 7 ! w i (h t ; y); ;
is continuous, …rst de…ne
and let d 1 denote the`1 metric on R 2njY j : Note that
Therefore,
Step 3: Checking all one-period deviations. Fix any > 0: In this step, we …nd " > 0 and > 0 that have the property stated in the theorem: if (G 0 ; p; ) is " approximation of (G; ) and p is regular for ; then for any uniformly strict PPE of G 1 ( ); there exists a public communication device and a truthful reporting strategy such that = ( ; ) is a PPE of G 01 p ( ; ). Choose 2 (0; 1) ; " > 0; and > 0 such that (4) and the following strict inequality are satis…ed
Suppose that (G 0 ; p; ) is an " approximation of (G; ) and p is regular for : Furthermore, suppose that is an uniformly strict PPE of G 1 ( ): Using (4) and applying step 2, there exists a collection f h t : h t 2 Y t ; t 0g and a public communication device = f h t : h t 2 Y t ; t 0g; where h t = (1 ) + h t ; such that truthful reporting is optimal in G 01 p ( ; ) given : Next, de…ne a reporting strategy as follows: 20 for h t 2 H; a i 2 A i ; s i 2 S i ;
We will show that = ( ; ) is a truthful PPE of the public communication extension G 01 p ( ; ): It is clearly truthful by de…nition. To verify sequential rationality constraints, we apply the principle of optimality and check one-period deviations at every public history h t 2 H at the beginning of each period. We must check two types of deviations: those which involve a deviation at the action stage and those that do not. By construction of , honest reporting is optimal when the equilibrium action is played within the same period, i.e. when (h t ) is played given public history h t : Consequently, the second type of deviation is not pro…table. To complete the argument, we must show that, for any h t 2 H and any i 2 N; player i cannot pro…tably deviate by …rst choosing an action a i di¤erent from a i h t and then choosing any report .
Abusing notation, let
Since is uniformly strict, at every h t and for every i 2 N; the following inequality must be satis…ed for every
Combining (6), (7) and (8), we conclude that
for every i ; every h t and every i 2 N . Let 0 = 3 : Then we can conclude that the suggested strategy = ( ; ) is a 0 uniformly strict truthful PPE of G 01 p ( ; ). This completes the proof of the theorem.
D. Proof of Theorem 3
Let Q = fq 2 R n j kqk = 1g and e i = (0; 0; ::; 1; :::; 0) > 2 Q with the ith coordinate equal to 1. First we prove two lemmata to prove Lemma 4.
Lemma 7
Suppose that p is distinguishable for some public coordinating device : Then there exists > 0 such that, if p is regular, then for any q 2 Q and a 2 A, there exists : Y ! R n and another public coordinating device 0 that satisfy the following conditions:
(i) E 0 j ja = 0 for j = 1; :::; n (9)
(ii) if 0 5 jq i j < 1 for each i 2 N; then (1)- (3) and an application of the separating hyperplane theorem.
Step 2: We …rst consider the case of (ii). Take any q 2 Q such that jq j j < 1 for any j. This q is …xed throughout step 1-4. Let i be a player such that jq i j jq j j for all j. If q i < 0, then de…ne x (a;q) : Y ! R n as follows: for each y 2 Y; From these de…nitions, it follows that q x (a;q) (y) = 0 for all y 2 Y so that condition (12) is satis…ed:
Step 3: For each s 2 S and a 2 A; let
as in the proof of Theorem 1. De…ne Note that > 0 and it is de…ned independent of a or q:
Step 4: In this step, we prove that condition (10) hold for x (a;q) : Y ! R n if p is regular and the following condition is satis…ed for and :
We need to show the following for all j : Observe that q j 6 = 0 for some j 6 = i and q i < 0 by assumption. > 0:
Step 5: In this step, we prove that condition (11) holds for x (a;q) : Y ! R n if p is regular and the following condition is satis…ed for and :
If ( ) is satis…ed, it follows directly from Theorem 1 that truthful reporting is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the one-shot information revelation game G 0 ; p; a;x ; x; a for any x and a: Hence we obtain E a;x [x j ja] E a;x [x j ja; for any a 2 A:
Step 6: Next consider the case of (iii). Take any q 2 Q such that jq i j = 1 for any i. Then it immediately follows from Step 1 and Step 3-5 that we can construct x (a;q) : Y ! R n that satisfy (13) and (14) in this case. This is because condition (12) , which requires payo¤ pro…les to be on a certain hyperplane, is not imposed this time.
Step 7: Finally, choose and small enough so that ( ) and ( ) are satis…ed in each case. Observe that we can choose and independent of a and q: For each a 2 A and q 2 Q; de…ne 0 := a;x and := x (a;q) E 0 [x (a;q) ja]: Then and 0 satisfy (9) in addition to (10)- (12) in the case of (ii) and (13)- (14) in the case of (iii). Therefore the lemma is proved.
We need one more lemma to prove Lemma 4.
Lemma 8 Let M R n be a closed and convex set with an interior point in R n . Suppose that each boundary point v 2 M is associated with the unique supporting hyperplane and the unique normal vector v (6 = 0) 2 R n such that v v v x for all x 2 M . Then for any point y 2 R n such that v v > v y; there exists 2 (0; 1) such that (1 ) v + y is in the interior of M for any 2 (0; ) :
Proof. Suppose that this is not the case, i.e. there does not exist such > 0: Let W = fx 2 R n j9 2 [0; 1] ; x = (1 ) v + yg. We …rst show W \ intM = ?: First v is not an interior point of M by de…nition. If (1 0 ) v + 0 y is an interior point for any 0 2 (0; 1]: Then (1 ) v + y is an interior point of M for every 2 (0; 0 ) as it is a strictly positive combination of v 2 M and (1 0 ) v + 0 y 2 intM: This is a contradiction. Hence W \ intM = ?: Since W \ intM = ?; we can apply the separating hyperplane theorem for each x = (1 ) v + y 2 W; obtaining (6 = 0) 2 R n such that (a) x x for all x 2 M: Normalize them so that k k = 1: Since x v; it also follows that (b) y v for every > 0 by the de…nition of x = (1 ) v + y. Take a sequence of n such that n > 0 converges to 0 and n converges to some (6 = 0) 2 R n : Then v x for all x 2 M (from (a)) and y v (from (b)) by continuity.
Finally 6 = v follows from v v > v y: Hence and v are di¤erent normal vectors that separate v from M . This is a contradiction.
We now prove Lemma 4, thus completing the proof of Theorem 3. .
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Choose > 0 satisfying the conditions of Lemma 8 and let W intV (G) be a smooth set:We will show that, for any v 2 W; there exists > 0; 2 (0; 1) and an open set U containing v such that U \ W B ( ; W; ) :
Step 1: Suppose that v is a boundary point of W . Let q 2 Q be the vector of utility weights such that v = arg max v 0 2W q v 0 and a = arg max a2A q g (a) : We …rst show that v is strictly enforceable for some w 0 : Y ! R n such that q v > q w 0 (y) for any y:
Let : Y ! R n and 0 be the payo¤ function and public coordinating device as de…ned in the conditions of Lemma 8 given q and a . Note that, by (ii), we can …nd c > 0 and 0 > 0 such that
for all a Then a ; 0 ; w 0 clearly (1 ) 0 -enforces the payo¤ pro…le v for every 2 (0; 1) (by (15) and (iii)).
Since W is in the interior of the feasible set,
Hence q g (a ) > q u ( ) for any 2 (0; 1) : Since q (y) = 0 by construction, this implies the desired inequality: q v > q u ( ) = q w 0 (y) for all y 2 Y:
Step 2 Since Y is a …nite set and q v > q w 0 (y) by step 1, it directly follows from Lemma 9 that w 0 takes a value in the interior of W for large enough discount factor.
Step 3: Next suppose that v is an interior point of W: In this case, it is clear that v is strictly enforceable with some w 0 : Y ! R n and furthermore w 0 (y) is in the interior of W for any y 2 Y if is close enough to 1.
Step 4 
